Epstein Secrets

d contact with Snowden a year earlier, Unfortunately, that room was occupied, but I was given a nearby room that served my purpose. Snowden had told Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, the Guardian reporters he met in Hong Kong, that he had hidden out at the Mira hotel since his arrival in Hong Kong because he fea

he later said, she was in charge of their “operational security.” When they finally settled at a table in the nearly empty restau- rant, she showed Greenwald e-mails she had received from Citizen Four. Greenwald, as he recounted, made “no connection” to the “long-forgotten emails” he had received from Snowden

ct, Snowden had stolen a great deal more than documents relating to domestic surveillance. He had also stolen secret documents from the NSA, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the British cipher service revealing the sources and methods they employed in their monitoring of adversaries, which was their job. By the time

technology operative for the Freedom of the Press Foundation; Jacob Appelbaum, the Tor proselytizer; Ben Wizner, the ACLU lawyer; Barton Gellman; and Glenn Greenwald. “It is not me that can’t keep a secret,” Abraham Lincoln joked. “It’s the people I | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 231 @ 9/30/16 8:13AM | |

’t.” In the same vein, Poitras could hardly rely on these five confidants not to tell her secrets (and Snowden’s) to others. Hours after he was told, Greenwald told his lover, David Miranda, about the source in great detail. He even asked him to evaluate the source’s bona fides for him. Gellman, for his part

, the other intelligence services, and the Department of Defense deemed what was relevant for national security. Even though the NSA remained part of the Department of Defense, its job went far beyond providing military intelligence. It also acted as a service agency to other American intelligence services. They pre- pared

013 while he was still on the NSA payroll. He also carefully orches- trated the exposure of the PRISM surveillance programs, precisely specifying, as Greenwald writes in his book No Place to Hide, who was to release the “scoops” in which newspapers. He gave Gellman a seventy-two-hour ultimatum for exposing P

. 13, 2013. 138 “Something is not right”: Transcript of interview with Alexander, Australian Financial Review, May 8, 2014. 138 This discovery came: “Glenn Greenwald’s Partner Detained at Heathrow Airport for Nine Hours,” Guardian, Aug. 18, 2013. 139 downloading documents: Ledgett was interviewed in this timeline by

that he compromised contained many other secret sources and methods. The full extent of the damage Snowden did may never be fully known, even though the Department of Defense spent the better part of a year, and tens of thousands of investigative man-hours, trying to sort out just the compromised sources and methods per- t

ibson in New York “The Guinness is good.” It was a pre-arranged code by which MacAskill certified Snowden’s credibility for the Guardian. Gibson told Greenwald to proceed with the story. Greenwald wrote his first story about NSA transgression based almost entirely on the FISA watrant that Snowden had copie

evealed to Wizner that she had found an anonymous source with access to U.S. government surveillance secrets. So he was not completely surprised when Glenn Greenwald, Poitras’ writing partner, asked him in July 2013 to contact Snowden in Russia. Snowden offered an opportunity for Wizner since the ACLU already had

of foreign governments. This latter mandate included the governments of allies as well as enemies. The President, the other intelligence services and the Department of Defense deemed what was relevant for national security. Even though the NSA remained part of the Department of Defense, its job went far beyond providing mil