Epstein Secrets

e end, I would have been willing to go to Cairo as part of such a defense team, but I certainly was tempted. I was less tempted by the offer made by Gaddafi’s Lybian lawyer. The Gaddafi offer was firm, accompanied by a signed formal retainer letter and contract. I have the contract in front of me as I wri

Arab Spring” of 2011, I received calls from individuals representing both deposed President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and then fugitive leader of Lybia, Muammar Gaddafi, both of whom were being accused of killing innocent civilians. A Norweigan human rights activist who was close to Mubarak asked me if I would be wi

up that was trained at the Howard Law School to be “observers.” During that short visit I had little direct contact with local Black residents of the South. I did meet several Black lawyers and civil rights workers, but they were generally from similar backgrounds to my own. My second trip was by myself

cently-overthrown Muslim Brotherhood President of Egypt, than Obama had with any other Arab leaders. They were happy when Washington ousted Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, and then unnerved when Washington simply walked away from the resulting chaos and extremism. And they certainly have not been reassured b

But China has been far from blameless: witness its heavy-handed approach to its Asian neighbors in pressing its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. And, while growing signs of impatience with North Korea EFTA00678387 have been welcomed as a harbinger of an eventual policy shift, f

e human rights violations in Arab countries and Iran. But then follow less justifiable motives. The war in Libya, for all the indignation over the Gaddafi regime's outrages, was a classical "small victorious war," at least for Paris and London at the time. However, the stake on it did not work. EFTA00

long-overdue volte-face. To prevent this change, they are trying to find non-existent external threats — or not to counter their emergence from the South, especially as it has no capabilities to do that. Russia is warned that it may lose its positions in the Middle East. Simultaneously, it is repeate

ed to meet the demands of its people for far reaching reforms. Arguably, the same reversal of outlook in Ankara occurred in relation to Libya after Muammar Gaddafi threatened to massacre his opposition, leading even to extending some Turkish support to the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 that shap

nsit states like Burma and Pakistan and is delivered to western China where Beijing's influence waxes and wanes. Consequently, Beijing is eying the South China Sea as a safer way to ensure access to the energy its needs to thrive. Yet Beijing's plan may be flawed. Estimates vary widely as to the size

d to meet the demands of its people for far reaching reforms. Arguably, the same reversal of outlook in Ankara occurred in relation to Libya after Muammar Gaddafi threatened to massacre his opposition, leading even to extending some Turkish support to the UN- EFTA_R1_00228271 EFTA01841735 backed NATO interv

oping those resources first. But Beijing's efforts could all be for naught if energy trends continue to develop as projected, and especially if the South China Sea turns up dry (so to speak). As a result, China's continued assertiveness in the South China Sea could compromise its claim to a peaceful