Epstein Secrets

rts, Evaluation and Inspections Report 16-05 (June 2016). 96 EFTA00039127 management failures at multiple levels within the BOP.,' Similar to the Bulger report, the numerous and serious transgressions that occurred in this matter came to light largely because they involved a high-profile inmate. The

OIG's investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inter

Release EFTA00172639 Limited Official Use Only—Not for Public Release and management failures at multiple levels within the BOP.53 Similar to the Bulger report, the numerous and serious transgressions that occurred in this matter came to light largely because they involved a high- profile inmate. The

Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant said he was aware that Epstein was required to have a cellmate due to a mass email that was sent to all of the MCC New York Lieutenants. According to the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, everyone who regularly worked in the SHU should have known that Epstein was required to have

ion Efforts, Evaluation and Inspections Report 16-05 (June 2016). 97 management failures at multiple levels within the BOP.57 Similar to the Bulger report, the numerous and serious transgressions that occurred in this matter came to light largely because they involved a high-profile inmate. Th

OIG’s investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inte

rts, Evaluation and Inspections Report 16-05 (June 2016). 96 EFTA01656810 management failures at multiple levels within the BOP.,' Similar to the Bulger report, the numerous and serious transgressions that occurred in this matter came to light largely because they involved a high-profile inmate. The

OIG's investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inter