Epstein Secrets

his brought Poteyev under immediate suspicion. Tipped off by the CIA to the FBI's error, Poteyev managed to escape by taking a train from Mos- cow to Belarus, where the CIA exfiltrated him to the United States. Poteyev had been saved from prison—or worse—but he was no lon- ger useful to the CIA as a mole.

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi

ught Poteyev under immediate suspicion. Tipped off by the CIA to the FBI’s error, Poteyev managed to escape by taking a train from Moscow to Minsk in Belarus. The CIA next exfiltrated him out of Belarus and to the United States. Poteyev had been saved from prison—or worse, but he was no longer useful to th

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than

rvant from Dagestan, who had amassed an estimated fortune of $7.1 billion. Kerimov recently had been charged for manipulating a Potash cartel case in Belarus. Most of these clients were reputed to be part of Putin’s inner circle. To break the ice, I asked him about Oliver Stone. I knew he had a small role

on the NSA payroll in May 2013. If he intended to damage the NSA’s ability to monitor unsuspecting individuals abroad, he clearly succeeded. Just as Robert Hanssen had compromised the NSA’s interception of communication at the Soviet Embassy in the 1990s, Snowden compromised the NSA’s interception of Jihadist ta