Epstein Secrets

s has not run, double jeopardy does not apply, and there are no other concrete indications that criminal prosecution is barred. See also Belmonte v Lawson, 750 F. Supp. 735, 739 (E.D. Va. 1990)("Courts should avoid engaging in crystal ball forecasts about what a prosecutor may or may not do ... ). Si

rns have been considered 'confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the

. 2011) 14 United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) 13 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.N.J. 2017) 9 United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1982) 8 United States v. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006) 11 United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633 (1926)

legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding retroactivity. Id. That is not the case here. As Judge Katzman of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative history should not be disregarded: When courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators cons

trial to impeach the witnesses' credibility as to particular aspects of their testimony. This falls short of substantial prejudice. United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 694 (2d Cir. 1982) (no prejudice where absent witness's testimony was "at best corroborative on minor points"). Specifically, the h

assessed on its own terms . . . based on the entire record." United States v. Maslin, 356 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2004). In assessing the evidence, the Second Circuit applies a burden-shifting framework. The defendant carries the initial burden of making a non-frivolous showing that the two counts in fact charge