Epstein Secrets

al responsibility to `take Care that the EFTA00208520 Laws be faithfully executed.'" United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States , 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547). This broad discretion rests largely o

C. § 3771(e) defines "crime victim" as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia." El The Victims Rights and Restitution Act (VRRA), 42 U.S.C. § 10607(c)(2), provides for a crime victim to have "reasonable protection from a susp

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

(2)(A) ("The term `crime victim' means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia."). The only provisions of the CVRA that even address state criminal proceedings are found in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(2)—a provision that addresses col

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

(2)(A) ("The term `crime victim' means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia."). The only provisions of the CVRA that even address state criminal proceedings are found in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(2)—a provision that addresses col