Epstein Secrets

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ment cannot provide "mountains of documents to defense counsel" as a substitute for a bill of particulars where one would otherwise be required, see Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 575, the provision of voluminous discovery in combination with some guidance about what is most relevant can vitiate a need for furthe

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch