Epstein Secrets

Many in EFTA00707089 Western foreign-policy circles feared that some of the Kingdom's aid was being used to fund Pakistan's nuclear program, with Riyadh expecting some of the final products in return. However, the increase in Saudi aid during the 1980s was due to other factors, [4]such as [4] Pakis

nd we are soon confronted with a nuclear-armed Iran. Kennedy faced an unpredictable, risk-taking and at times aggressive opponent in Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Yet he frustrated Khrushchev's ambitions and helped the U.S. avoid war through a combination of American nuclear superiority, firmness in defendin

iplomacy and publicity only angered the Saudis more. With America backing this axis—while also failing to heed Saudi warnings about Iran and Syria—Riyadh wanted to undercut rather than support American diplomacy. An alliance with the Egyptian military against Mr. Morsi's weakening government provided

what the Russians and Iranians fear would have been an easy win in Syria cannot be explained by them in any other way. This is dangerous. Just as Nikita Khrushchev concluded that President Kennedy was weak and incompetent after the Bay of Pigs failure and the botched Vienna summit, and then proceeded to test t

o be Prince Salman, a more pragmatic and progressive prince with a half century's experience as the governor and builder of the kingdom's capital, Riyadh. Nayif, born in 1933 and interior minister since 1975, was never a proponent of reform, and advocated a tough line on human-rights issues for deca

ng to stop the Soviets from operationalizing the missiles already there. A tense second week followed during which Kennedy and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, stood "eyeball to eyeball," neither side backing down. Saturday, Oct. 27, was the day of decision. At the last minute, the crisis was resolved wit