Epstein Secrets

d, No. 15 Cr. 616 (KBF), 2016 WL 1055737 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) 271 United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973) 187 United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980) 205, 206, 208, 223 United States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (MN), 2017 WL 237651 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) 85, 227,

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

e "somewhat alike" or "hav[e] a general likeness to each other." United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Rule 8(a) does not require `too precise an identity between the character of

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

d, No. 15 Cr. 616 (KBF), 2016 WL 1055737 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) 271 United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973) 187 United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980) 205, 206, 208, 223 United States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (MN), 2017 WL 237651 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) 85, 227,

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

e "somewhat alike" or "hav[e] a general likeness to each other." United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Rule 8(a) does not require `too precise an identity between the character of

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

77) 96, 97 United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1979) 53 United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973) 125 United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980) 138, 139, 140, 149 United States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) 58, 151,

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

e "somewhat alike" or "hav[e] a general likeness to each other." United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Rule 8(a) does not require `too precise an identity between the character of

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

e "somewhat alike" or "hav[e] a general likeness to each other." United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Rule 8(a) does not require `too precise an identity between the character of

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame