Epstein Secrets

vilege where the trial court determines it to be legitimate based on the court’s knowledge of the case and the expected testimony. United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1981). This is not a case, however, where this narrow exception

AM Document 81 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/20/2009 Page 4 of 11 potential sources of information and to produce those sources.” Id. at 41. In Bear Sterns, the Court explained that the facts of Hubbell were unique and do not support a blanket, all-encompassing assertion by a witness or party that the

declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself; his assertion does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. Id. at 684. In Bear Sterns, the Court found that the defendant failed to meet his burden in asserting the privilege against self-incrimination in response to a request for pro

rivilege where the trial court determines it to be legitimate based on the court's knowledge of the case and the expected testimony. United States,. Goodwin 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980); United States'. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1981). This is not a case, however, where this narrow exception sho

ertain records sought in the government's subpoena would be directly incriminating. Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 582. Id. at 683. As noted by the Court in Bear Sterns, a determination that the production of documents would be testimonial cannot be premised on the witness's say so: A witness is not exonerated from

nt to hi[m]/her in a particular case.” 203 See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982); Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364; Imbler, 424 U.S. 409. 204 The discretionary authority under USAM § 9-27.240 to de

gations surfaced that Epstein had cooperated with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York’s investigation of investment bank Bear Stearns, and that he had been released early from his 18-month imprisonment term because of that 185 In