Epstein Secrets

2018) passim United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 1996) 253 United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2000) 229 United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (MN), 2018 WL 1737236 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) passim United States v. Plaza-Andrades, 507 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2013) 291 Unite

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

rwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN), 2018 WL 1737236, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018); see also 114 EFTA00077746 Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ("To mandate an eviden

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

2018) passim United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 1996) 253 United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2000) 229 United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (MN), 2018 WL 1737236 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) passim United States v. Plaza-Andrades, 507 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2013) 291 Unite

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

rwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN), 2018 WL 1737236, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018); see also 114 EFTA00039561 Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ("To mandate an eviden

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

, 2018) passim United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 1996) 166 United States v. Pino, 212 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2000) 151 United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (MN), 2018 WL 1737236 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) passim United States v. Plaza-Andrades, 507 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2013) 199 Unite

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

rwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN), 2018 WL 1737236, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018); see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ("To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the c

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

rwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN), 2018 WL 1737236, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018); see also 114 EFTA00103139 Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ("To mandate an eviden

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame