Epstein Secrets

es. Prior to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, “stovepiping” had protected NSA data on its computers from networks used by other intelligence services. After the 9/11 Commission concluded that part of the reason U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to “connect the dots” in advance of the attack was related to this practice,

d other intelligence services. As a leading specialist in the field of corporate cyber security, Dell had no problem obtaining sizable contracts from the NSA’s Technology Directorate. In 2008, the NSA had in effect outsourced to Dell the task of reorganizing the backup systems at its regional bases. Dell had

g’ of information on terrorism cases in the 56 individual field offices across the country.” Here the NSA was merely following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to make their data more accessible to other agencies concerned with potential terrorist attacks, but as a result, the inner sanctum of the NSA became

inside intruder. In 2009, Snowden, as we know, found his way into the NSA through a temporary job with an outside contractor that was work- ing for the NSA’s Technology Directorate to repair and update its backup system. Four years later, by maneuvering to get hired by another outside contractor with acces

led stove-piping that insulated highly- sensitive data from the NSA’s other computer networks. Here they were merely following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to make their data more accessible to other agencies concerned with potential terrorist attacks. As a result, the inner sanctum of the NSA became mor

bearing directly on the ongoing intelligence war. Snowden also copied from these compartments in a matter of weeks, as has been previously mentioned, the NSA’s Level 3 sources and methods used against Russia, Iran and China. The Snowden breach demonstrated that the NSA’s envelope of secrecy was at best illus