Epstein Secrets

g’ of information on terrorism cases in the 56 individual field offices across the country.” Here the NSA was merely following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to make their data more accessible to other agencies concerned with potential terrorist attacks, but as a result, the inner sanctum of the NSA became

to Bamford, it took nearly nine months to arrange the meeting. “I have been try- ing to set up an interview with him [Snowden]—traveling to Ber- lin, Rio de Janeiro twice, and New York multiple times to talk with the handful of his confidants who can arrange a meeting,” Bamford @ recounted in Wired. After my din

attack in 2001, NSA data had been protected by “stove-piping” that separated NSA’ computers from networks used by other intelligence services. After the 9/11 Commission concluded that part of the reason why US intelligence agencies were unable to “connect the dots” in advance of the attack was because this “stove-pip

ng to Greenwald’s account, Snowden had given both him and Poitras identical copies of the NSA documents in Hong Kong. When Greenwald returned home to Rio de Janeiro, he found his copy was corrupted. But Poitras still had her digital copy of whatever stolen documents that Snowden had distributed to them. So Greenw

led stove-piping that insulated highly- sensitive data from the NSA’s other computer networks. Here they were merely following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to make their data more accessible to other agencies concerned with potential terrorist attacks. As a result, the inner sanctum of the NSA became mor

t his copy of the documents were corrupted, Poitras made a copy of the thumb drive that Snowden gave her in Hong Kong and sent it to her Greenwald in Rio de Janeiro by a courier. That courier was intercepted by British authorities at Heathrow Airport. When examined, the Poitras-Greenwald thumb drive contained som