Epstein Secrets

pation in al Qaida's jihadist campaign." Id. 11425. Specifical- ly, the Kingdom allegedly maintained and controlled several of the charities within al Qaeda's infrastructure. Id. 11399. The Federal Plaintiffs claim Saudi Arabia knew the threat that these charities posed par- ticularly to the United State

e Sultan and Prince Turki both move to dismiss the complaints against them in Ashton v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army. 02 Civ. 6977 (S.D.N.Y.); Barrera v. AI Qaeda Islamic Army, 03 Civ. 7036 (S.D.N.Y.); Burnett v. AI Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 02 Civ. 1616 (D.D.C.); Burnett v. Al Baraka hrv. & Dev. § 2331 et

began a company in the 1940s that now supplies automobiles, soft drinks, construction equipment, and other related to any alleged conspiracy or to al Gaeda's activities. EFTA00795081 IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Cut as 349 F.Supp-20 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) goods and services to large port

including charities, banks, front organizations, terrorist organizations, and financiers who provided financial, lo- gistical, and other support to al Qaeda.1 See, e.g., Ashton Complaint 1 5; Burnett Complaint "Introduction"; Federal Com- plaint 11142-66. The complaints assert subject matter jurisdiction

6. The various complaints make substan- tially similar accusations against Prince Sultan. See Consolidated Jeffress Decl. 16. IIRO is allegedly an al Oaeda front that has been tied to the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the 1998 embassy bombings. See, e.g., Burnett Complaint 711 156, 240, 242. 17.

t mem- bers of the Spanish al Qaeda cell used Arab Bank to make wire transfers. Bur- nett Complaint 1 138 (alleging Arab Bank is "used regularly by al Qaecla's Spanish cell for transfers of cash to members of al Qaeda operating in Germany, Pakistan, Af- ghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Bosnia, and elsewhere");

ugh their contributions to, and support of, Islamic charities that they knew or should have known were supporting ter- rorist organizations such as al Qaeda.n Additionally, Plaintiffs allege Prince Turki aided and abetted the terrorists by at- tempting to deflect their activities away from Saudi Arabia and

Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C.2003)—Plaintiffs submit that the moving Defendants knew that the primary target of Osama bin Laden's and al Qae- da's campaign of terror was the United States and that by providing assistance to these terrorists, who Plaintiffs claim were Defendants' co-conspirato

149 F.3d at 123; Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1023; Bohn III, 340 F.Supp2d at 906. Even move and launder money. 12(e) Statement I. Plaintiffs allege that al Oaeda has pervert- ed the Zakat and Hararm principles in Islam- ic banking to collect and distribute money to individuals and cells throughout the world.

his interactions with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban were part of his official func- tions. Id. 15. In June 1998, King Fand sent Prince Turki to Kandahar to meet with the Taliban and to relay the official Saudi request that Osama bin Laden be extradited to Saudi Arabia for trial. Id 1 11. The Talib

m- HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017830 --- PAGE BREAK --- 766 ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as insurance carriers, brought actions against al Qaeda, al Qaeda’s members and associ- ates, alleged state sponsors of terrorism, and individuals and entities who allegedly provided support to Al Qaeda, asserting cau

m Act (ATA) complaint by survivors of victims of September 11, 2001 attacks, alleging that Saudi Princes con- tributed to charities that supported al Qaeda, and that al Qaeda repeatedly and publicly targeted United States, failed to allege causal connection sufficient to satis- fy New York standard for c

with the Ashton case on Decem- ber 6, 2004. Prince Sultan and Prince Turki have each also filed a separate motion to dismiss in Federal Insurance v. Al Qaida, 03 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y.), both of which are fully submitted and are resolved in this opinion. The Federal Insurance Plaintiffs are forty-one insuranc

ign. In particular, the Sahel countries of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso may become vulnerable to similar campaigns, as the influence of Al-Quaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which shares institutional links with Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, is growing in the region. As a result of massive in

strategies are in place. Afghanistan Inaccessibility is a challenge in implementing vaccination campaigns. The southern provinces of Hilmand and Kandahar arc well known for their insecurity. Inaccessibility caused by insecurity can have severe consequences — as demonstrated by Maiwand District, Kandah

e," he said. "I do not think that al-Qaeda is out of business because they lost Osama bin Laden. Not by a long shot." The second hard truth is that al-Qaeda's future is inextricably linked with that of Afghanistan and the Taliban. "Al-Qaeda is not [in Afghanistan] because we are," Crocker said. "If we dec

the first post-Taliban government. "It's better than I thought," he said. "The biggest problem in Kabul is traffic. Out in the provinces, even in Kandahar, you see traffic jams there. Kabul is a more liveable city by far than the Baghdad I left in 2009." And not only for Americans: Afghan school enrol