Epstein Secrets

ld substantially outweigh its probative value. These arguments rely heavily on a district court opinion from outside this circuit, United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010). After careful consideration of the Defense's arguments and the thorough reasoning in Raymond, the Court conclud

t offer "testimony regarding any specific victim." Dkt. No. 386 at 3. The Defense has the law backwards on this point. As explained above regarding the Second Circuit's Nimely decision, an expert may not testify as to a specific witness's credibility. 414 F.3d at 398. And as other courts have explained in admitting

ed the jury's verdict). Against this weight of authority, the defendant relies principally on one case from the District of Maine. United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010). The proposed 13 EFTA00088815 testimony in this case is readily distinguishable from that in Raymond. There, t

nment to identify the co-conspirator statements it plans to use at trial in its initial round of pretrial motions. There, the defendant argued that the Second Circuit's practice of conditional admission of co-conspirator statements at trial would prejudice her because "any cautionary instruction would be of doubtful

ld substantially outweigh its probative value. These arguments rely heavily on a district court opinion from outside this circuit, United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010). After careful consideration of the Defense's arguments and the thorough reasoning in Raymond, the Court conclud

t offer "testimony regarding any specific victim." Dkt. No. 386 at 3. The Defense has the law backwards on this point. As explained above regarding the Second Circuit's Nimely decision, an expert may not testify as to a specific witness's credibility. 414 F.3d at 398. And as other courts have explained in admitting

ld substantially outweigh its probative value. These arguments rely heavily on a district court opinion from outside this circuit, United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010). After careful consideration of the Defense's arguments and the thorough reasoning in Raymond, the Court conclud

t offer "testimony regarding any specific victim." Dkt. No. 386 at 3. The Defense has the law backwards on this point. As explained above regarding the Second Circuit's Nimely decision, an expert may not testify as to a specific witness's credibility. 414 F.3d at 398. And as other courts have explained in admitting