Epstein Secrets

e a party fails to provide "sufficient facts to state with reasonable certainty that the privilege applies, the burden is not met." United States v. Blackburn , 538 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (M.D. Fl. 1982) (citing Federal Trade Commission v. TRW Inc. , 628 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Katz , 623 F.2d

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

re a party fails to provide "sufficient facts to state with reasonable certainty that the privilege applies, the burden is not met." United States I Blackburn , 538 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (M.D. Fl. 1982) (citing Federal Trade Commission I TRW Inc. , 628 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Katz , 623 F.2d 1

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

e a party fails to provide "sufficient facts to state with reasonable certainty that the privilege applies, the burden is not met." United States v. Blackburn, 538 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (M.D. Fl. 1982) (citing Federal Trade Commission v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 12

lements, are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns—specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense- specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repres