Epstein Secrets

ciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

ciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

ciable deterrence." United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningful

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o