Epstein Secrets

retary general, Ban Ki-moon, issued a last-minute invitation for Iran to attend, then rescinded it after strong objections from America; from Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival; and from the Syrian opposition. The United States has said that Iran could not participate without publicly accepting a 201

e's competition, perhaps suspicion, but not an active or proxy warfare." This vision isn't going to mollify the suspicions of those concerned about Arab Gulf security. In December, Lpeculated that a "plausible, but still from an Arab point of view alarming, scenario is that the US is seeking to create a

Na 2 0 0 Kuwait 4.8 Na 3.4 Na 0.2 212 27 4 1 Oman 3.1 3.9 I1.1 Na Na 8 3 II Qatar 3.5 3.6 Na Na Na 591 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 6.5 9.5 17.8 Na Na Na 103 0 Na UAE 1.9 1.9 14.6 Na Na Na 15 0 Na Average Gulf 4.0 4.4 12.3 11.4 0.2 270 25 2.5 1 Medit

i GDP per capita (PPPd US 5) Human Develo pment Index° (%) Life Expectancyb (years) Literacy Rateb (%) Combined enrolment ratio' (%) Arab Gulf countries High income United Arab Emirates 0.816 74.4 76.7 67 2.9 20.530 Qatar 0.6 19,844 0.826 71.8 81.7 81 Kuwait 2.4 18,700 0.8

overthrow a fellow Arab head of state, President Bashar al-Assad - and to do whatever they can to hurt Iran. Iranians increasingly interpret Saudi Arabia's mood as a hungering for war; and Gulf statements do often have that edge of hysteria and aggression: a recent EFTA_R1_02203688 EFTA02720376 ed

te debt. Desperate for cash, the government issued "diaspora bonds" last March in an attempt to tap into the savings of the Egyptian expats in the Arab Gulf region. Though no official figures have been released, proceeds from the sales so far seem to fall very short of the $2 billion the government had

n the region at the same time as they supported it in backroom dealings, quietly authorizing facilities support and air, land, and sea access. But if Arab Gulf states were quietly supportive in the past, their opposition to American military force is likely to grow in the future. They read the aftermath of t

were essential for crisis management in the Cold War strategic relationship after the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are likely to look for their own nuclear deterrents. Much like France wanted its own nuclear force de frappe during the Cold War, the Gulf states wi