Epstein Secrets

g the relative lack of specific guidance in the context of an application to modify protective orders in criminal cases), see also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2015) ("[m]otions to modify protective orders in criminal cases appear to be infrequent"), decisions that do exist have

decisions that do exist have rejected the kind of blurring of the line between criminal and civil proceedings that the defendant attempts here. See Calderon, 2017 WL 6453344, at 5-6 (denying a defendant's application for modification of a criminal protective order so he could use certain discovery materi

are of any. Though precedent on this issue appears to be somewhat sparse— perhaps because few defendants attempt such a maneuver—see United States v. Calderon, 15 Cr. 025, 2017 WL 6453344, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (discussing the relative lack of specific guidance in the context of an application to

in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346 at *I (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (same). See also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard for "good cause" in the civil context when evaluating whether to modify a protective orde

nd Circuit have applied the standard for modification of protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3:15-CR-25 (JCR), 2017 WL 6453344, at •2 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in a

in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346 at *I (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (same). See also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard for "good cause" in the civil context when evaluating whether to modify a protective orde

nd Circuit have applied the standard for modification of protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3:15-CR-25 (JCH), 2017 WL 6453344, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in a

in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346 at *I (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (same). See also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard for "good cause" in the civil context when evaluating whether to modify a protective orde

nd Circuit have applied the standard for modification of protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3: I5-CR-25 (J0-1), 2017 WL 6453344, at •2 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in

g the relative lack of specific guidance in the context of an application to modify protective orders in criminal cases), see also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2015) ("[m]otions to modify protective orders in criminal cases appear to be infrequent"), decisions that do exist have

are of any. Though precedent on this issue appears to be somewhat sparse— perhaps because few defendants attempt such a maneuver—see United States v. Calderon, 15 Cr. 025, 2017 WL 6453344, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (discussing the relative lack of specific guidance in the context of an application to

in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346 at *I (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (same). See also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard for "good cause" in the civil context when evaluating whether to modify a protective orde

nd Circuit have applied the standard for modification of protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3: I5-CR-25 (JCR), 2017 WL 6453344, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. I, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in a