Epstein Secrets

, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founded a nonprofit that was developing a mall in the Bronx, and for which he provided consulting services. In 1984 and 1985, he made two loan applications for funds to invest in the project, on which he made

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founded a nonprofit that was developing a mall in the Bronx, and for which he provided consulting services. In 1984 and 1985, he made two loan applications for funds to invest in the project, on which he made

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founded a nonprofit that was developing a mall in the Bronx, and for which he provided consulting services. In 1984 and 1985, he made two loan applications for funds to invest in the project, on which he made

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

ir. 1992) (same). In 142 EFTA00095234 Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founded a nonprofit that was developing a mall in the Bronx, and for which he provided consulting services. In 1984 and 1985, he made two loan applications for funds to invest in the project, on which he made

influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 121 EFTA00095213 addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards require the jury to determine whet

, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founded a nonprofit that was developing a mall in the Bronx, and for which he provided consulting services. In 1984 and 1985, he made two loan applications for funds to invest in the project, on which he made

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful

natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whe

ng a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime that he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob the Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the champ that he robbe

No. 98 Cr. (KIK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999) 275,281 United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 70 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 182, 184,200,222 United States v. Geanev, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) 284 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649

ng a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime that he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob the Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the charge that he robb

No. 98 Cr. (JGK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. II, 1999) 275, 281 United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 70 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 182, 184, 200, 222 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) 284 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 64

ng a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime that he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob the Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the charge that he robb

No. 98 Cr. (JGK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. II, 1999) 275, 281 United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 70 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 182, 184, 200, 222 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) 284 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 64

ng a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime that he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob the Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the charge that he robb

No. 98 Cr. (JGK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. II, 1999) 183, 189 United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 48 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 122, 135, 148 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) 191 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.

ng a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime that he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob the Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the charge that he robb

No. 98 Cr. (JGK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. II, 1999) 275, 281 United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 70 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) 182, 184, 200, 222 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) 284 United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 64