Epstein Secrets

be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon, 2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the Giuffre action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know th

as standing. 1 B. There is no good faith. 5 C. The government's inevitable discovery doctrine fails. 5 II. The Government's violation of Manindell requires suppression. 7 III. The Government's violation of the Fifth Amendment requires suppression 10 IV. The Court should hold an evidentiary

ity to be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon, 2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know th

as standing. 1 B. There is no good faith. 5 C. The government's inevitable discovery doctrine fails. 5 II. The Government's violation of Manindell requires suppression. 7 III. The Government's violation of the Fifth Amendment requires suppression 10 IV. The Court should hold an evidentiary

ity to be heard, but also by affirmatively misleading Chief Judge McMahon, 2 To this day, Judge Preska—who is presiding over the action since Judge Sweet's passing and is addressing the Protective Order on a daily basis as the parties brief what material should be unsealed—apparently does not know th

as standing. 1 B. There is no good faith. 5 C. The government's inevitable discovery doctrine fails. 5 II. The Government's violation of Manindell requires suppression. 7 III. The Government's violation of the Fifth Amendment requires suppression 10 IV. The Court should hold an evidentiary

ome provisions and adding language that confidential material could be disclosed to law enforcement. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. B). On March 18, 2016, Judge Sweet entered a protective order governing the discovery and dissemination of confidential information after the parties agreed to the form of the order o

atively limited, due to the confidential nature" of the litigation. (Id. at 2 n.1). The Government also submitted that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test to evaluate the Government's ability to obtain access to materials covered by a protective order because (1) the Martindell balancin

a were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity t

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu

a were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity t

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu

idential information at the conclusion of the case, including Maxwell's deposition transcripts refused to do so although ordered to do so by Judge Sweet.' In its application to the governmen Not only did the government misunderstand how the Protective Order worked, but its argument also supports r

overnment there should have either moved to intervene or issued a subpoena to obtain th . For one thing, the Fourth Amendment was not at issue in Manindell, so the Court had no occasion to decide whether a warrant might have been required. For another, Martindell does not speak to what showing would hav

s and that require a subpoena duces tenon of such records to be supported by probable cause). Finally, of course, the government didn't comply with Manindell because it never gave Maxwell notice and an opportunity to quash the subpoena and to challenge the government's misrepresentations through the adver