Epstein Secrets

S. 151, 108th Cong. (as engrossed in the Senate, Feb. 24. 2003) 7 Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014), at 3 7 iv EFTA00103713 Senator Leahy, Amber Legislation, Cong. Rec. 149:50, 55147 (2003) 7 v EFTA00103714 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Ghislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Memorand

legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding retroactivity. Id. That is not the case here. As Judge Katzman of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative history should not be disregarded: When courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators cons

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

l Amendment to Protect Crime Victims, S.J. Res. 1: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 128-29 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), see also Steven J. Twist & Daniel Seiden, The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment: A Brief Point/Counterpoint, 5 PHOENIX L. REv. 341, 356, 378 (2012

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted'!’—a holding clearl

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

the Constitution, but a law that extends an un-expired statute of limitations does not. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003). Senator Leahy, who co- sponsored the PROTECT Act, expressed concerns in a committee report that the proposed retroactivity provision was "of doubtful constitution

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

the Constitution, but a law that extends an un-expired statute of limitations does not. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003). Senator Leahy, who co- sponsored the PROTECT Act, expressed concerns in a committee report that the proposed retroactivity provision was "of doubtful constitution

assim 18 U.S.C. § 3509(aX8) 14 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (1990) 8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) 12 Pub. L. No. 101-647 8 Other Authorities Senator Leahy, Amber Legislation, Cong. Rec. 149:50, 55147 (2003) 3 iv EFTA00028907 --- PAGE BREAK --- Ghislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Reply Memo

uit's acknowledgment that the retroactivity of the 2003 Amendment must be analyzed under Landgraf. Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 54-58 (2d Cir. 2017). 3 No Landgraf analysis was performed, nor was Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision discussed, in United States v. Brown, 800 F

x, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining "structure and legislative history" as part of first Landgraf step). And as the government acknowledges, "the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the statute and the legislative history" at the first Landgraf step. Opp. 28 (citing In re Enterprise Mortgage Acce

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

the Constitution, but a law that extends an un-expired statute of limitations does not. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003). Senator Leahy, who co- sponsored the PROTECT Act, expressed concerns in a committee report that the proposed retroactivity provision was "of doubtful constitution

stitutional amendment. Congress is watching to see whether the Judiciary (and the Executive) will fully and fairly implement this new Act. As Senator Leahy warned, "Passage of this bill will necessitate careful oversight of its implementation by Congress." 1! Construing the CVRA to require changes is al

nt asserts has been harmed by a crime or who self-identifies as such qualifies as a "victim"); cf. In re WR. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals not convicted of a crime, but the government can attempt to obtain