Epstein Secrets

46 United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) 194 United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 240, 268 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 37 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

46 United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) 194 United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 240, 268 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 37 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) 130 xiv EFTA00095081 United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 110 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 159, 176 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 28 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). "Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame