Epstein Secrets

ction request) has a compelled testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); McCormick on Evidence, Title 6, Chap. 13. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, §138 (6th Ed.). The "implicit authentication" rationale appears to be the

onsideration of all the circumstances in the case, ... that the answer( s) cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate." Id. at 488. (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (188l)(emphasis in original).)) Here, the Court cannot conclude that answers and responses cannot possibly have a

testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); McCormick on Evidence, Title 6, Chap. 13. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, § 138 (6th Ed.). The privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted

, Rogers v. United States, 1951, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, and to require him to answer if 'it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.' Temple v. Commonwealth, 1880, 75 Va. 892, 899. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in whic

testimonial aspect." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); McCormick on Evidence, Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 63 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/25/2009 Page 7 of 37 Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein Page 7 Title 6, C

, Rogers v. United States, 1951, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, and to require him to answer if 'it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.' Temple v. Commonwealth, 1880, 75 Va. 892, 899. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in whic