Epstein Secrets

ation process in order to be accessible and . . . documents that have no such role, such as those used in discovery, cannot be reached." Id. (citing Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986)). Amodeo I found instructive F.T.C. v. Standard 9 EFTA00075016 CasQaf et43git_910 1e0begn5eRFIW

nt is filed with a court, it is a judicial document; otherwise it is not. See id. (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 782). The Amodeo I court cited two other Third Circuit cases confirming that circuit's litmus-test approach to identifying judicial documents: Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. H

Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (same); see also United States v. Casteneda, No. 18 Cr. 047, 2018 WL 888744, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2018) (same); United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d 32, 41 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). CONCLUSION As set forth above, the defendant is an extreme risk of flight. The Government respectfull

d. Cir. 1982). Every circuit with published pattern instructions inform juries that they are not to consider the indictment as evidence. See, e.g., Third Circuit ("An indictment is simply a description of the charge(s) against a defendant. It is an accusation only. An indictment is not evidence of anything,

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix

ges, 346 U.S. at 216. There is no corresponding indication that Congress intended the "essential ingredients" test to apply to Section 3283. As the Third Circuit has explained in rejecting an identical argument: While Bridges did adopt an "essential ingredient" test, the limitations-extending statute at issu

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix E

ges, 346 U.S. at 216. There is no corresponding indication that Congress intended the "essential ingredients" test to apply to Section 3283. As the Third Circuit has explained in rejecting an identical argument: While Bridges did adopt an "essential ingredient" test, the limitations-extending statute at issu

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix E

ges, 346 U.S. at 216. There is no corresponding indication that Congress intended the "essential ingredients" test to apply to Section 3283. As the Third Circuit has explained in rejecting an identical argument: While Bridges did adopt an "essential ingredient" test, the limitations-extending statute at issu

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix

ges, 346 U.S. at 216. There is no corresponding indication that Congress intended the "essential ingredients" test to apply to Section 3283. As the Third Circuit has explained in rejecting an identical argument: While Bridges did adopt an "essential ingredient" test, the limitations-extending statute at issu