Epstein Secrets

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide