Epstein Secrets

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

sewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity

acility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per

elsewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional Ma against surplusage and redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan'. Walker 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal disabilities like insanity,

facility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the scienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States'. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant], using the Internet, acted with a specific intent to per