Epstein Secrets

y the New York State Department of Financial Services and the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank after the bank was caught doing business with Burma, Libya, Sudan, Iran, and Syria, which were under U.S. sanctions at the time. 297. For another example, in January 2017, Deutsche Bank agreed to a $7.2 billion s

lar pattern to what it did for Epstein, Deutsche Bank onboarded and provided accounts to a billionaire who was a relative of one of the founders of Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia, an entity long suspected of financing terrorists. 294. In a similar pattern to what it did for Epstein, Deutsche Bank onboarded an

was. “Bin Ladin began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia [in 1991]. He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. In early 1992, the Al Qaeda leadership issued a jihad against the Western ‘occupation’ of Islamic lands...[s]pecifically singling out U.S. forces fo

detail below.” (Together with NCB and Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz, Khaled bin Mahfouz and Yassin al Kadi are referred to here is ahe “NCB Defendants.”) Al Rajhi Bank played an analogous and equally important role in al-Qaeda’s financial infrastructure, by also providing financial services to al-Qaeda charity front

rtising these accounts, Al Rajhi Bank “provid[ed] a mechanism to allow al Qaida’s supporters to deposit funds directly into those accounts.” JA3828. Al Rajhi Bank’s operations are consistent with their support of al-Qaeda front charities. In 1999, Al Rajhi Bank was warned. by United States government officials “t

14 2016F 2018F 2020F mu US meme Canada mam Mexico mmm North Sea mmm Russia Kazakhstan . . 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 mum Asia Brazil mmm Sudan/So. Sudan other —+— total non-OPEC base =2016@$45/bbl m2017@$59/bb!_ =2018@$67/bb| m2019+@$75/bbl Source: IEA, BofA Merrill Lynch Commodities Researc

e + weight in MSCI weight in MSCI ADTVactive buying active days buying passive days passive days passive days Saudi EM buying US$m buyi buying buying AL RAJHI BANK 9.5% 0.1% 37.2 546.5 14.7 477.7 12.8 1,024 27.5 ALINMA BANK 2.0% 0.0% 223.0 116.9 0.5 102.2 0.5 219 1.0 ALMARAI 44% 0.1% ip. 255.8 33.1 223.6 28.9 47

to work with SBG in Jeddah. Ashton Complaint 1 548; Burnett Complaint 1317. SBG allegedly continued to support Osama bin Laden after he relocated to Sudan in 1991. Ash- ton Complaint 1548; Burnett Complaint 1317. For example, SBG, through two subsidiaries allegedly supported Osama bin Laden’s participat

, check clear- ing services, or any other routine banking service.” Jd. In light of the liberal plead- ing standards, however, Judge Robertson denied Al Rajhi Bank’s motion to dismiss and permitted it to request a more defini- tive statement under Rule 12(e). Jd. at 110. The Burnett Plaintiffs provided an 89-parag

Qaeda organization” because of its support of an al Qaeda guest house in Egypt, its office’s close proximity to Osama bin Laden’s personal office in Sudan, and its relationship with bin Laden’s brother-in-law Defendant Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. (Ashton Compl. F§ 310, 315, 317; Burnett Compl. Ff 234, 239,

es assured of its subject matter and personal jurisdiction over NCB, Plaintiffs’ claims are doomed because the Court dismissed similar claims against Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, and Arab Bank. NCB contends that Center for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 194-95 (2d Cir.2002), supports its