Epstein Secrets

to allow a party to `prosecut[e] or defend[] a lawsuit without fear of having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.' Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380, 384 (Fla. 2007); see also Levin, 639 So.2d at 608 C[A]bsolute immunity must be afforde

OURT: Mr. King, anything that's being alleged here that goes outside of the broad spectrum that I have read into the record that has its genesis in Echevarria and was quoted by the Wolfe Third District Court of Appeal opinion? MR. KING: There's nothing alleged. (T. 53-54). Accordingly, as explicitly stat

requests this Court to infer about Wright as a result of its citation in Levin, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in Echevarria that "the nature of the underlying dispute simply does not matter," and mandated that the litigation privilege be broadly applied "across the board

ving the litigation privilege. In the instant case, the trial court was legally bound by the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Wolfe, as the Florida Supreme Court stated unequivocally that a "trial court may not overrule or recede from the controlling decision of" an appellate court. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2

lies across the board to actions in Florida, both to common-law causes of action, those initiated pursuant to a statute, or of some other origin," Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380, 384 (Fla.2007), and reaffirmed that "ralbsolute immunity must be afforded to any act

act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding ... so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding." Levin, 639 So.2d at 608. In Echevarria, the Court reiterated its broad application of privilege "applies in all causes of action, statutory as well as common law." Echevarria, 950 So.2d

Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907). In Levitt, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.I994), the Florida Supreme Court extended the litigation privilege, already applicable to defamatory statements (slander and libel) and perjury, to all other torts so long as the

King, anything that% being 10 alleged here that goes outside of the broad II spectrum that I have read into the record that has 12 its genesis in Echevarria and was quoted by the 13 Wolfe Third District Court of Appeal opinion? 14 MR. KING: There's nothing alleged. 15 Mr. Edwards' testimony, though, wa

da Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007), as well as reviewing the application and analysis of those cases in Wolfe

ing and a lengthy hearing, this Court ruled that the litigation privilege barred Edwards's causes of action against Epstein. The Court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa

da Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007), as well as reviewing the application and analysis of those cases in Wolfe

King, anything that's being 10 alleged here that goes outside of the broad 11 spectrum that I have read into the record that has 12 its genesis in Echevarria and was quoted by the 13 Wolfe Third District Court of Appeal opinion? 14 MR. KING: There's nothing alleged. 15 Mr. Edwards' testimony, though, wa

ing and a lengthy hearing, this Court ruled that the litigation privilege barred Edwards's causes of action against Epstein. The Court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa

da Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCalla, Rayner, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007), as well as the application of those cases in Wolfe v. Foreman, 38 Fla. L.

ssue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.510(c). This court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa