Epstein Secrets

MR. BREWER: So let's get into the Wolfe case. That's where we're headed next. And really there's a trilogy of cases. There's the Levin case, the Echevarria case, if I'm somewhere close to pronouncing that correctly, and the Wolfe case. All of them deal with litigation privilege which dates back to 191

•• "THE COURT: This deals with the litigation privilege?" The attorney then goes on to say, "Yes, sir, it does deal with litigation privilege. Echevarria also deals with the litigation privilege. Delmonico stands for the proposition that the issues with regard to privilege are some issues of law for

submits that the trial court's Order granting his Motion for Summary Judgment was proper, as the binding decisions by the Florida Supreme Court in Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007) and Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639

414 (Fla. 2012). STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS In December 2009, Appellee, Jeffrey Epstein, filed suit against Scott Rothstein ("Rothstein") and Appellant, Bradley J. Edwards, based upon Epstein's justifiable belief at the time of filing his Complaint that these two individuals, and other unknown part

Judgment motion that Appellant could not satisfy all of the elements of a Malicious Prosecution claim, including that the suit by Appellee against Appellant resulted in a bona-fide termination in favor of Appellant. Appellee took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which does not constitute a bona-

to allow a party to `prosecut[e] or defend[] a lawsuit without fear of having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.' Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380, 384 (Fla. 2007); see also Levin, 639 So.2d at 608 C[A]bsolute immunity must be afforde

OURT: Mr. King, anything that's being alleged here that goes outside of the broad spectrum that I have read into the record that has its genesis in Echevarria and was quoted by the Wolfe Third District Court of Appeal opinion? MR. KING: There's nothing alleged. (T. 53-54). Accordingly, as explicitly stat

requests this Court to infer about Wright as a result of its citation in Levin, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in Echevarria that "the nature of the underlying dispute simply does not matter," and mandated that the litigation privilege be broadly applied "across the board

able and inapposite to the instant case, and as such its narrow holding has no bearing on, and should not be considered by, this Court. Similarly, Appellant cites Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) in support of his assertion that the litigation privilege is inapplicable to a malicious

his assertion that the litigation privilege is inapplicable to a malicious prosecution claim. However, such reliance thereupon is misplaced. First, Appellant's characterization of Levin as impliedly approving the survival of a malicious prosecution claim in the Wright case is completely unfounded. In Levi

ed directly to the litigation. Under well-established Florida Supreme Court precedent, the litigation privilege applies to all causes of action. See Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007); Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, M. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.

ct occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding . . . so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding." Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608. In Echevarria, the Court reiterated its broad application of privilege "applies in all causes of action, statutory as well as common law." Echevarria, 950 So. 2d

submits that the trial court's Order granting his Motion for Summary Judgment was proper, as the binding decisions by the Florida Supreme Court in Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007) and Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, M. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 S

414 (Fla. 2012). STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS In December 2009, Appellee, Jeffrey Epstein, filed suit against Scott Rothstein ("Rothstein") and Appellant, Bradley J. Edwards, based upon Epstein's justifiable belief at the time of filing his Complaint that these two individuals, and other unknown part

ct occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding . . . so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding." Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608. In Echevarria, the Court reiterated its broad application of privilege "applies in all causes of action, statutory as well as common law." Echevarria, 950 So. 2d

ed directly to the litigation. Under well-established Florida Supreme Court precedent, the litigation privilege applies to all causes of action. See Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007); Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell,.. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2

submits that the trial court's Order granting his Motion for Summary Judgment was proper, as the binding decisions by the Florida Supreme Court in Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barren & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007) and Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell,.. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.

414 (Fla. 2012). STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS In December 2009, Appellee, Jeffrey Epstein, filed suit against Scott Rothstein ("Rothstein") and Appellant, Bradley J. Edwards, based upon Epstein's justifiable belief at the time of filing his Complaint that these two individuals, and other unknown part