Epstein Secrets

ateson. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: Ballantine, 1979. BC94. S. Baron-Cohen. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. MIT Press, 1994. BDL93. Louise Barrett, Robin Dunbar, and John Lycett. Human Evolutionary Psychology. Princeton University Press, 1993. BDS03. S Ben-David

hich data and procedure are explicitly identical, and there is just one new active data structure in place of the distinction between AtomSpace and MindAgents Where on this continuum does the "mere learning" end and the "real self-modification" start? In this chapter we consider some mechanisms for "adva

ilation 319 schema learning the learning of schemata carrying out cognitive processes in more specialized, context-dependent ways than the general MindAgents do. Eventually, once a CogPrime instance becomes sufficiently complex and advanced, these cognitive schema may replace the MindAgents altogether, l

Bateson. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: Ballantine, 1979. Bog4. S. Baron-Cohen. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. MIT Press, 1994. BDL93. Louise Barrett, Robin Dunbar, and John Lycett. Human Evolutionary Psychology. Princeton University Press, 1993. BDS03. S Ben-David an

mpilation 319 schema learning the learning of schemata carrying out cognitive processes in more specialized, context-dependent ways than the general MindAgents do. Eventually, once a CogPrime instance becomes sufficiently complex and advanced, these cognitive schema may replace the MindAgents altogether, lea

which data and procedure are explicitly identical, and there is just one new active data structure in place of the distinction between AtomSpace and MindAgents Where on this continuum does the "mere learning" end and the "real self-modification" start? In this chapter we consider some mechanisms for "advan

h Int. Conf. Very Large Data Bases, 1994. Ash65. Robert B. Ash. Information Theory. Dover Publications, 1965. Bau04. E. B. Baum. What is Thought? MIT Press, 2004. Bau06. E. Baum. A working hypothesis for general intelligence. In Advances in Artificial General ligence: Concepts, Architectures and Algor

d effort management frameworks attempt to enforce this, via minimizing the amount of effort spent by the system in getting to a certain conclusion. MindAgents operating primarily on one kind of knowledge (e.g. MOSES, PLN) may for a time seek to follow the shortest paths within their particular correspondin