Epstein Secrets

d after the date of enactment,' " referenced in Landgraf, "unambiguously addresses the temporal reach of the statute" (citation omitted)); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 329 n. 4, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2064 n. 4, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (recognizing from Landgraf that statutory language such as, " '[This Act

Motion To Dismiss, dated May 22, 2009, MOLT Accordingly, Defendant states: I. Legal Standard (pp. 1-2 of Plaintiff's MOLI Plaintiff's reliance on Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), as the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard is misplaced. As discussed in Defendant's motion to dismiss, (pp. 16 — 17), the

ucement claim be denied.'' 17 Indeed. la] claim of fraudulent inducement under Alabama law is similar to one of misrepresentation." Whitney Bank v. Murphy. Civil Action No. 11-00614-KI340, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40046. 2013 WL 1191235. at '11 (S. D. Ala. Mar. 22 2013). 18 The undersigned notes that BIC

t Rule l3(a)(2) requires that the pleading "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" (quoting Conley v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 41. 47. 78 S. Ct. 99.2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957))). B. The Plaintiffs claims against BIC are properly asserted in tort. BIC argues that all cl

d after the date of enactment,' " referenced in Landgraf, "unambiguously addresses the temporal reach of the statute" (citation omitted)); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 329 n. 4, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2064 n. 4, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (recognizing from Landgraf that statutory language such as, " `[This Act

ion To Dismiss, dated May 22, 2009, ("MOL"). Accordingly, Defendant states: I. Legal Standard (pp. 1-2 of Plaintiff's MOLI Plaintiff's reliance on Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), as the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard is misplaced. As discussed in Defendant's motion to dismiss, (pp. 16 - 17), the