Epstein Secrets

legitimacy that would allow the ruling party to take difficult decis=ons without the street rising up against them. In Iran, for example, Pres=dent Ahmadinejad tried to implement this in two stages. However, the resul= was an increase in expenditure, as more than 95% of the people applied for direct financi

th of Iran's involvement in the fig=ting. It is entirely conceivable, in other words, that a post-Assad regime in Syria would be explicitly pro=96a1 Qaeda or even more openly pro-Iran. Either result would be unacceptab=e to Israel. Of course, an extended civil wa= in Syria does not serve Israel's inte

ffice is a conservative of one type or the other, since they have to be vetted by the regime. Is there really a difference between forces loyal to Ahmadinejad's group and those close to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's leadership? It is not really true that reformist candidates or candidates who identi

f the successor regime to the Assads. The opposition forces have been endorsed not just by the US, but also by al- EFTA_R1_00230060 EFTA01842755 Qaeda, which must be a first. Remembering that western weapons once supplied the precursors to the Taliban in Afghanistan, the west should be extremely

looks incapable for now of taking its protest movement back out onto the streets. Mass protests against the 2009 re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad marked the worst unrest since the Islamic Revolution three decades earlier, but were quelled with lethal force by the state's security apparatus, h

erers. It aspires to change global history again by provoking more conflict to set the stage for its new caliphate. The strategy is insane, but Al- Qaeda is determined to pursue it. The 9/11 attacks cost about a half-million dollars to organize and execute, according to the U.S. 9/11 Commission repor