Epstein Secrets

ienceDirect Theoretical Population Biology journal home pa go: ..vww.elscvier.comflocateApb A two-player iterated survival game John Wakeley a.*, Martin Nowak a'b'c 'Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology. Harvard University. Cambridge. MA, 02138. USA b Program for Evolutionary Dynamics. Harvard

not cooperate. Besides Hawk-Dove, other well-studied games of this type are the game of chicken and the snowdrift game (Doebeli and liauert. 2005: Nowak, 2006a). We introduce a two-player survival game which can fall into any of these four classes. It may also change, for example from a Hawk-Dove g

30 40 60 60 70 80 Number of Iterations, n Fag. 0. Values °IG(n) — c(n) and b(n) — d(n) over n = 1...80 iterations for two games which begin as Prisoner's Dilemmas at n = I. In both cases, the loner survival probabilities are ck, = 4 = 0.9. PanelA: a = 0.97.6 = 0.94. c = 0.99,d = 0.95; these are the

rsity Cambridge, Massachusetts June 2009 EFTA00748858 @2009 - Corina Elena Tarnita All rights reserved. EFTA00748859 Thesis advisor Author Martin A. Nowak Corina Elena Tarnita Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations Abstract Life is that which evolves. Evolutionary dynamics shape the living

apter 5 is published as: "Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies", T. Antal, A. Traulsen, H. Ohtsuki, C.E. Tarnita, M.A., Nowak. J. Theor. Biol., doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010, 2009. Chapter 6 is submitted as: "Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies"

asier it is for cooperators to outcompete defectors. We give a simple relationship between a and the critical benefit-to-cost ratio in a simplified Prisoner's Dilemma game. (War +1 a — (NW —1. This shows that for the purpose of establishing strategy dominance, in the limit of weak selection, it suffice

eractions (Anderson & May 1991, Nowak & May 1994), the evolution of metabolic pathways (Pfeiffer et al 2001), theoretical approaches to immunology (Nowak et al 1991, 1995), and the study of animal and human behavior (Parker 1974, Enquist & Leimar 1983, McNamara & Houston 1986, Milinski 1987, Fudenber

rs on Cooperators and Defectors. Then in 5.3.2 we show how mutation alone can make a strategy more abundant. Finally in 5.3.3 we study the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. 5.3.1 Cooperators, Defectors, Loners To see the difference between our weak selection and a traditional game-theoretic approach, l