Epstein Secrets

nalysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996) (Judicial deference [94] to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of

t from and broader than the attorney-client privilege." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S. Ct. 2160, 45 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508). In fact, the Eighth Circuit went on to consider the application of the work product doctrine and concluded that it did not apply

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

e "work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege." United States v. Nobles 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (citing Hickman 329 U.S. at 508). In fact, the Eighth Circuit went on to consider the application of the work product doctrine and concluded that it did not apply b

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

"work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508). In fact, the Eighth Circuit went on to consider the application of the work product doctrine and concluded that it did not apply

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wane, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

"work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (citing Hickman 329 U.S. at 508). In fact, the Eighth Circuit went on to consider the application of the work product doctrine and concluded that it did not apply b

ng principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Whether to investigate po

vid. 804(b)(1)? the better reasoned conclusion is that Rule 612 does apply at depositions. 1. The Work Product Doctrine In the now famous case of Hickman 11. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 1 L.Ed. 451 (1947), the Supreme Court re- cognized the work product doctrine. The doctrine creates a "pro

g principle that It]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large pan to the separation of powers doctrine — prosecutors are delegates of the President, helping him

f litigation.' United States' Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). The work-product doctrine applies in civil and criminal litigation. Id. at 236. In Hickman' Taylor, the Supreme Court described the policy behind the doctrine protecting the opinion work-product of lawyers. The Court explained that a lawye