Epstein Secrets

97 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required under the Due Process Clause). ° United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 456-71 (1996) (examining selective prosecution claim based on racial bias); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)

83, 86 (1963) (holding prosecution's withholding of the confession of defendant's confederate violated defendant's due process rights). 7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (extending Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel to indigent state criminal defendants); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.

lose the identity of its witnesses before trial. However, the basis for such grants of authority now seems defunct. For instance, in United States v. Armstrong, the Ninth Circuit recognized no authority exists in the federal rules for requiring the government to disclose the names of its witnesses. 74 Still,

disclosure of witness names before trial appears inconsistent with the federal rules. And even if the Ninth Circuit's approach was valid at the time Armstrong was decided, such an approach is no longer valid in light of the CVRA. Rule 57(b) only provides a basis for court authority in the absence of control

ermits the court in both civil and criminal cases to "request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." 49° And before Gideon v. Wainwright, *°° courts could request 45 Td. 46 Td. 47 Tn possible response to such concerns as I raise here, the Advisory Committee modified the Advisory Comm

246 150 Cong. Rec. $10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphases added). 247 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 248 150 Cong. Rec. $4264 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added). 249 See 18 U.S.C.

nd criminal cases. 3!! While these cases do not directly involve [*913] appointment of counsel for crime victims, their principles 309 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (discussing "fairness" to the defendant as a reason for recognizing a right to appointed counsel). 310 150 Cong. Rec. S426