Epstein Secrets

2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke, No. 07 Cr. 971 (RPP), 201 1 WL 3738969 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) 153, 160, 163 United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 278 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) 252 United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

e cites no authority for the proposition that the Government has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228,239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Government's `Brady obligations extend only to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or c

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke, No. 07 Cr. 971 (RPP), 2011 WL 3738969 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) 153, 160, 163 United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 278 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) 252 United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

e cites no authority for the proposition that the Government has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Government's `Brady obligations extend only to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke, No. 07 Cr. 971 (RPP), 2011 WL 3738969 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) 153, 160, 163 United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 278 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) 252 United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

e cites no authority for the proposition that the Government has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Government's `Brady obligations extend only to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) 82 United States v. Coke, No. 07 Cr. 971 (RPP), 2011 WL 3738969 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) 105, 109, 111 United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 186 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) 165 United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d

nited States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jeffiies, 405 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2005). Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

e cites no authority for the proposition that the Government has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Government's `Brady obligations extend only to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke, No. 07 Cr. 971 (RPP), 2011 WL 3738969 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) 153, 160, 163 United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 278 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) 252 United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d

rcuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

e cites no authority for the proposition that the Government has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Government's 'Brady obligations extend only to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156