Epstein Secrets

plained in its Order, a defendant seeking material pursuant to a Rule 17(c) subpoena bears the burden of satisfying the standard in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Pursuant to that standard, a Rule 17(c) subpoena "should not issue unless it meets three criteria: `(1) relevancy, (2) admiss

ocument 269 Filed 05/04/21 Page 7 of 9 Page 7 individual "is a prospective witness in this case; the Government will provide Carton with his 3500, Jencks and Giglio material by the deadline set by the Court"); United States v. Yudong Zhu, No. 13 Cr. 761 (VM), 2014 WL 5366107, at *3 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct

glio material well in advance of trial, and the defense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial.");

and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required information to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks Act sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare for cross- examination. These representations are sufficie

glio material well in advance of trial, and the defense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial.");

and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required information to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks Act sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare forcross- examination. These representations are sufficien

glio material well in advance of trial, and the defense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial.");

and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required information to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks Act sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare for cross- examination. These representations are sufficie

glio material well in advance of trial, and the defense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial.");

and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required information to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks Act sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare for cross- examination. These representations are sufficie

glio material well in advance of trial, and the defense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial.");

and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required information to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks Act sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare for cross- examination. These representations are sufficie

lege must be narrowly construed because it comes with substantial costs and stands as an obstacle of so to the search for truth. See United State Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10, 94 S. . 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). [91[101 The dimensions of the privilege itself are reasonably well honed. The priv-

statements of a witness on the subject of his testimony are the kind of evidentiary matter to which an adversary is entitled. F198. The Court in Jencks quoted the language of Mr. Clgef Justice Marshall in United State Burr, 25 Fed.Cas., No. 14,694, pp. 187, 191 (Va. 1807): "Now, if a paper be in

e proposal and accompanying note, I am concerned that the limits on subpoenas found in the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nixon 734 might be vitiated by a broad rule. To ensure courts consistently apply Nixon's substantive and procedural standards to victim-related subpoenas,

might aid in impeaching government witnesses at trial, "the legislative history expresses a much greater concern with limiting the application of the Jencks decision so that it would not hamper the workings of law enforcement by forcing wholesale disclosure of government materials and files." 33° The Jen

plained in its Order, a defendant seeking material pursuant to a Rule 17(c) subpoena bears the burden of satisfying the standard in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Pursuant to that standard, a Rule 17(c) subpoena "should not issue unless it meets three criteria: `(1) relevancy, (2) admiss

ocument 269 Filed 05/04/21 Page 7 of 9 Page 7 individual "is a prospective witness in this case; the Government will provide Carton with his 3500, Jencks and Giglio material by the deadline set by the Court"); United States v. Yudong Zhu, No. 13 Cr. 761 (VM), 2014 WL 5366107, at *3 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct