Epstein Secrets

obtained counsel paid for by Epstein. (Jane Doe 2 Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.) Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") A. Marie Villafafia ("line prosecutor" "Villafaiia") testified that both Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 received letters describing their rights under the CVRA. Although Jane Doe 1 and 2 were given Ms. Vi

rty. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court should not grant summary judgment unless it is clear that a trial is unnecessary, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress

here Jane Doe 2 had obtained counsel paid for by Epstein. (Jane Doe 2 Dec1.11 5-7.) Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") ("line prosecutor" "Villafaiia") testified that both Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 received letters describing their rights under the CVRA. Although Jane Doe 1 and 2 were given and t

rty. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court should not grant summary judgment unless it is clear that a trial is unnecessary, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress

, OPR concluded that "the evidence does not show that [Former USAO-SDFL U.S. Attorney Alex] Acosta, [Former USAO-SDFL supervisor Andrew] Lourie, or Villafaiia agreed to the nonprosecution provision to protect any of Epstein's political, celebrity, or other influential associates." OPR Report at 168.11 In

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix

le friend who was a well- known socialite, but, according to Villafafia, in 2007, they "didn't have any specific evidence against her." Accordingly, Villafaiia believed that the only "co-conspirators" of Epstein who would benefit from the provision were the four female assistants identified by name. 20

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix E

le friend who was a well- known socialite, but, according to Villafafia, in 2007, they "didn't have any specific evidence against her." Accordingly, Villafaiia believed that the only "co-conspirators" of Epstein who would benefit from the provision were the four female assistants identified by name. 20

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix E

complying with certain parts of the NPA. OPR Report at 95. According to the report: At the same time, at [USAO-SDFL supervisor] Lourie's request, Villafaiia sent the NPA and its addendum to Lourie and Oosterbaan. Oosterbaan responded to Lourie that he was "not thrilled" about the NPA; described Epstein'

d States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) 209 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) 222 United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) 212 United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) 162 United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM) 286 ix

nd Belohlavek told OPR that the Chief of the Police Department would not regularly play a role in the state victim notification process. 427 Although Villafaiia’s notes indicate that she researched Florida Statutes §§ 960.001 and 921.143 when she drafted unsent letters to victims in November and December 2007

tely three weeks abroad. Extensive international travel of this nature further demonstrates a significant risk of flight. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2005). There can be no assurance that, upon release, the defendant would suddenly lack access to such means of travel