Epstein Secrets

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress i

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). EFTA00208

e additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Executive Vice-President of Coast Bank, and defendant John Miller, president of American Mortgage Link. Coon and Miller were charged in a one-count Information on October 15, 2008, with conspiracy to deprive the bank of honest services in violation o

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress i

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey' United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress int

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress i

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey'. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress in

RA, when the purchasers were required to pay a two percent mortgage origination fee, instead of the one percent fee which Coast Bank of Florida and American Mortgage Link, the mortgage origination firm, had agreed would be paid by a purchaser. The additional one percent was pocketed by defendant Phillip Coon, an Exec