Epstein Secrets

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress i

sue a direct appeal rather than petition for the writ as provided by statute and more than two years have passed since the district court sentenced Aguirre. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellants would not be entitled to mandamus relief ... Id. at 55-56 (brackets in original removed).

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). EFTA00208

sue a direct appeal rather than petition for the writ as provided by statute and more than two years have passed since the district court sentenced Aguirre. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellants would not be entitled to mandamus relief ... Id. at 55-56 (brackets in original removed).

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress i

sue a direct appeal rather than petition for the writ as provided by statute and more than two years have passed since the district court sentenced Aguirre. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellants would not be entitled to mandamus relief ... Id. at 55-56 (brackets in original removed).

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey' United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress int

sue a direct appeal rather than petition for the writ as provided by statute and more than two years have passed since the district court sentenced Aguirre. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellants would not be entitled to mandamus relief . . . Id. at 55-56 (brackets in original removed).

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress i

sue a direct appeal rather than petition for the writ as provided by statute and more than two years have passed since the district court sentenced Aguirre. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellants would not be entitled to mandamus relief ... Id. at 55-56 (brackets in original removed).

anon of statutory construction that "discourages courts from adopting a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage." Bailey'. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)(noting that each word in a statute is intended to have "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning"). Congress in

sue a direct appeal rather than petition for the writ as provided by statute and more than two years have passed since the district court sentenced Aguirre. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellants would not be entitled to mandamus relief ... Id. at 55-56 (brackets in original removed).