Epstein Secrets

have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense to statutory rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the "Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its de

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense to statutory rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the "Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its de

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense to statutory rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the "Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its de

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense to statutory rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the "Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its de

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense to statutory rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the "Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its de

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense to statutory rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the "Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its def