Epstein Secrets

e deposition of the Secretary of Agriculture, whose order fixing the maximum rates to be charged at the Kansas City stockyards was being challenged. The Supreme Court observed that the proceeding before the Secretary "has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding," and that probing of the mental processes

ce on the CVRA and the Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act as granting authority for the district court to allow discovery. Id. at 234. The Fourth Circuit observed that, "[t]his was wise strategy, as nothing in those two statutes support the district court's exercise of power." Id. The appellate court

th Cir.2010); United States v. Meacham, supra, 115 F.3d at 1495.96. We can place the blame for judicial preoccupa- tion with the word "dominant" on the Supreme Court, which in Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374, 64 S.Ct. 1037, 88 L.Ed. 1331 (1944) , a Mann Act case, said that engaging in forbidden se

instructions. (The evolution of "dominant pur- pose" is considered at length in our opinion in United States v. Vang, supra, 128 F.3d at 1070.72.) The Fourth Circuit stated sensibly in United States v. Bennett, supra, 364 F.2d at 77, 78 n. 4, that "the `dominant motive' test seems completely inappro- priate in a

tlement agreement constituted Page 10 an "implied waiver" of this privilege. Id at 622-26. The court began its analysis with a con- sideration of the Supreme Court's decision in Nobles, noting that that decision held that an attempt to make testimonial use of work product resulted in an implied waiver of the p

f the mental impressions? conclusions, opin- ions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. The Fourth Circuit has explained that this formulation of the doctrine divides work product into two categories, "fact work product," which may be discovered upon a