Epstein Secrets

jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (citing Apprendl, 530 U.S. at 482-83, 120 S.Ct. 2348). Two years later, in Ring the Supreme Court held that an aggravating factor rendering a defendant death-eligible "operate[s] as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater of- fense

. FN26. Currently, the circuit courts are split as to whether duplicative aggravating factors are unconstitu- tional and as to the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Jones. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have aligned with the Tenth Circuit and adopted their own variations of tke rule in McCullah. Se

light of Jones, see United States D. 1?obin- son, 367 F.3d 278, 292-93 (5th Cir.2004) ("Although our case law once [supported the theory], the Su- preme Court recently admonished that it does not support that theory of review.") O 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. https://web2.westl

enabling the client to conform his conduct to the dictates of the law and to present le- gitimate claims and dt enses f if litigation ensues. See Upjohn Co. I United States, O 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. https://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?vi-2.0&mt=EleventhCircuit

) ( en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent all decisions of the prior Fifth Circuit court of Appeals decided prior to October 1, 1981. FIThe Supreme Court called this "a novelty in criminal procedure with which we are wholly unacquainted, and one which might involve a betrayal of the secrets of the gra

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

) ( en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent all decisions of the prior Fifth Circuit court of Appeals decided prior to October 1, 1981. FIThe Supreme Court called this "a novelty in criminal procedure with which we are wholly unacquainted, and one which might involve a betrayal of the secrets of the gra

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

rgue that the work-product privilege is unavailable for a number of reasons. (DE 265 at 6, 8, 14-16). The work-product doctrine traces its roots to the Supreme Court's recognition that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain r 161 degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties an

_00059577 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CCIN(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022401 EFTA 00170127 EFTA01296795 Page 71 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87203, * Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981)); see also In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1981) (even under c

for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663, 668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language of [Rule 26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for ay litigation o

"a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means" than is needed to justify discovery of fact-based work product. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States 14 EFTA00086458 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 330 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2015 Page 15 of 51 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981));

r for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663,668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language of [Rule 26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for ars litigation

"a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means" than is needed to justify discovery of fact-based work product. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 14 EFTA01657765 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 330 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/06/2015 Page 15 of 51 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981));