Epstein Secrets

restrictions upon bail pending appeal may undoubtedly 'work to the disadvantage' of defendants."). In reaching this conclusion, we are mind of the Supreme Court's decision in Kring Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, L.Ed. 506 (1883). In Krin,g, the Court held that an ex post facto violation had occurred w

d=%7bFEDF5709-3AEA-4F74-8619-... 4/10/2008 EFTA00191715 Page 17 of 24 765 F.2d 944 765 F.2d 944, 53 USLW 2628 (Cite as: 765 F.2d 944) As the Supreme Court has stated, "[p]resent federal law has made an appeal from a district court's judgment of convic- tion ' in a criminal case what is, ' effect, a

alto Shapiro United States, 335 U.S. 1, 19, 68 S.Ct. 6, 1385, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (following rule of construction of Mike). More recently, in Kastigar, the Court up- held the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 6002 on the ground that use immunity "is coextensive with the scope of the privi- lege again

certain charges pending in Alabama. Be cause it disputed the very existence of a grant of immunity, the government object- ed to the holding of a Kastigar hearing as unwarranted. Faced with this disputed claim of an un- written grant of immunity, the magistrate did not hold a traditional Kastigar hea

. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508, 99 S.Ct. 2445, 61 L.Ed2d 80 (1979) (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Our case is not an interlocutory appeal, but the Supreme Court's cases in that field are instructive because they reinforce the narrowness of a defendant's ability to chal- lenge the Government's decision to purs

approved. Even assuming that irreparable harm is a factor that may the Government% authority to proceed with a prosecution, for example, the Su- preme Court has allowed those appeals only in very limited circumstances. For example, the Double if pardy Clause, see U.S. Cont. amend. ("Igor shall any pe

rturn a denial of concurring in part and dissenting in part). such relief. Id. We also keep in mind the In the case before us, the organizations' Supreme Court's admonition that any in- voter education and registration efforts are junction regarding government functions is unquestionably protected from unwar

itness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that the scope of the immu- nity granted must be as broad as the privi- lege. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1859. Due to the cumbersome requirements of obtaining properly authorized statutory im- munity, U.S. Attorneys often

for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663, 668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language of [Rule 26(b)(3)] protects materials prepared for ay litigation o

investigation, and Ms. likely testimony. Exhibit 1 at P-003732 thru P-003733. 7. On February 5, 2007, I provided Mr. Eisenberg with two proposed Kastigar letters that, again, discuss the grand jury's investigation. Exhibit 1 at P-003739 thru P-003743, P-003745. 8. In response to a complaint from Mr.

timony solely as a victim/winless. During our last conversation regarding Ms. , you indicated that she was unwilling to speak with us pursuant to a Kastigar letter and that she also was unwilling to speak with the grand jury and intends to invoke the Fifth Amendment if questioned. Please confer with her

authority to review a grand jury subpoena for reasonableness. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1991). While the Supreme •Court has held that grand jury subpoenas are presumed reasonable, that presumption may be overcome and a subpoena quashed where, as here, "there is no re

521-23. Interestingly, in that case, the government conceded that "the leaking of privileged materials to investigators would raise the specter of Kastigar-like evidentiary hearings". Id. at 517. This case presents the same specter should Mr. Epstein be indicted. The recognized importance of the attorn

s will produce information relevant to the, general subject of the grand jury's investigation". R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. at 301. Normally, as the Supreme Court noted in R. Enterprises, Inc., recipients of a grand jury subpoena have little or no knowledge of the crime the grand jury is investigating and will

521-23. Interestingly, in that case, the government conceded that "the leaking of privileged materials to investigators would raise the specter of Kastigar-like evidentiary hearings". Id. at 517. This case presents the same specter should Mr. Epstein be indicted. The recognized importance of the attorn