Epstein Secrets

be incompatible with the purpose of the FSIA, which is to grant governmental, not private corporate immunity, and ... would reflect infidelity to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dole Food" Id. at 218. Accordingly, it reiterated that "'a subsidiary of an instrumentality is not it- self entitled to instrumentalit

WU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir.2003) (noting a court may "devistel the procedures [to] ferret out the facts pertinent to jurisdiction"); Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1981) (noting a court has considerable procedural leeway in de- ciding whether discovery would assist re

n Landgraf v. USI Film Products, which I cited in my papers for a different proposition, but it's found at 511 U.S. 244. In that case, your Honor, the U.S. Supreme Court was considering a very similar situation with respect to a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. In that case, Title VII, prior to the defendan

e of the evidence, either at trial or at a pretrial evidentiary hearing. See CutCo Industries, Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986); Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 889, 904 (2d Cir. 1981). But at this stage, prior to discovery, the Court must "credit a plaintiff's averments of jurisdi

upport of this argument, the Federal Plaintiffs cite Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 480, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003), in which the Supreme Court held that instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. has specifically addressed the issue. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_01

, APWU v. Potter, 348 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir.2003) (noting a court may “devis[e] the procedures [to] ferret out the facts pertinent to jurisdiction”); Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1981) (noting a court has considerable procedural leeway in de- ciding whether discovery would assist res-