Epstein Secrets

atement reveals how inapposite a federal prosecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal

erson ..."). § 2423(b) is not such a statute. Federal court decisions watering down the "for the purpose of " requi ment fly in the face of the two Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak l

stein is prepared to plead guilty and accept a sentence for that offense—a sentence that, notably, is far more severe than that meted out to other "Johns" convicted of violating Florida's solicitation laws for cases in which sexual activity was alleged. Though CEOS points out its admirable goal of "p

" Id. Any suggestion that the government's search here was "particularly offensive" due to the location and duration of the search runs counter to the Supreme Court's admonitions in Johns and Montoya de Hernandez. It also effectively requires the government to supply every port of entry with the equipment and st

tomobile, even though the police conducted their search three days after the police stopped the vehicle and at the police station. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 485-88, 105 S.Ct. 881, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985). The Court rejected the argument that "searches of containers discovered in the course

nment's search here was "particularly offensive" due to the location and duration of the search runs counter to the Supreme Court's admonitions in Johns and Montoya de Hernandez. It also effectively requires the government to supply every port of entry with the equipment and staff needed to conduct

S.Ct. 962, 85 LEd. 4416, and Douglas I. City of Jeannette, supra. 01 We think a more likely explanation of the use of this phrase is that the Su- preme Court had in mind such cases as Hague v. C. I. 0., supra, in which it ap- peared that plaintiffs seeking to hold peace- ful meetings and to distribute lit

ate act. For this he was adjudged by the Circuit Court to be in contempt, and put in custody of the United States marshal. Thereupon he applied to the Supreme Court for leave to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, which the court denied. The act was held to be unconstitutional because, am

been applied that in general the equity courts are without jurisdiction to restrain criminal proceedings. In Attorney General'. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns.Ch. 371, Chancellor Kent said: 'If a charge be of a criminal nature, or an offense against the public, and does not touch the enjoyment of proper

ions—a description used by CEOS itself—it cannot be shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as

stein is prepared to plead guilty and accept a sentence for that offense—a sentence that, notably, is far more severe than that meted out to other "Johns" convicted of violating Florida's solicitation laws for cases in which sexual activity was alleged. Though CEOS points out its admirable goal of "p

atement reveals how inapposite a federal prosecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal

gress, and administration policy statements intended in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 prosecutions. Evans, and his co-conspirators (Madison and Yeasty) were not "Johns." They operated a for profit prostitution ring marked by control of, and extreme violence toward, the victims, who they knew were underage. Indeed,

s that, "while not the equivalent of criminal a post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thorn v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]se

ted States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 240, 268 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 37 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

ited States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 240, 268 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 37 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

ited States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 240, 268 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 37 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

ited States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 110 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 159, 176 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 28 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 202 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.

that, "while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he "expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., "[s]peaking only for [him]sel

ted States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 162 United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 240, 268 United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) 37 United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 294 United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir.