Epstein Secrets

r the witnesses to appear on July 10, 2007, but pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the appearance was moved to July 17, 2007. Neither Mr. Riley nor the records custodian appeared, and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein filed the instant motion on July 17, 2007, shortly before the 4:00 p.m. appeara

ises six arguments against the enforceability of the two grand jury subpoenas: first, that Epstein Fifth Amendment privilege bars the subpoenas to Riley and Riley Kiraly; second, that the subpoenas violate Epstein's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights; third, that the subpoenas are unreasonable

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

r the witnesses to appear on July 10, 2007, but pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the appearance was moved to July 17, 2007. Neither Mr. Riley nor the records custodian appeared, and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein filed the instant motion on July 17, 2007, shortly before the 4:00 p.m. appeara

ses six arguments against the enforceability of the two grand jury subpoenas: first, that Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege bars the subpoenas to Riley and Riley Kiraly; second, that the subpoenas violate Epstein's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights; third, that the subpoenas are unreasonable

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

t is to these portions of the response to which this reply is directed. I. The first area which requires reply is the government's assertions that Riley simply failed, without notice and without excuse, to appear at the time scheduled for his grand jury appearance. See Response at 1, 5, 6 n.6. This

nued from July 10, 2007, until July 17, 2007, by agreement of the parties. On July 16, 2007, counsel for Epstein were informed by Deputy Chief that Riley did not have to appear physically before the grand jury if a motion to quash the subpoena was filed by Epstein before the end of the day on July 17

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res