Epstein Secrets

ide whose boss leans dovish. "On one hand, we've seen this movie before -- crazy nuke states pretend to negotiate while buying time to enrich (a la North Korea) ... [B]ut his perceived openness seems to have the implicit backing of the mullahs -- which adds a new element to these negotiations, and one that

't building redundant enrichment facilities. There is a chance, of course, that EFTA00663304 Iran already has secret nuclear facilities (both the Natanz facility and the Fordo facility were carefully hidden from prying eyes for several years before they were discovered), so redundancy might be an in

ee that the Arak reactor is not functional. Fordow would be closed, and all Iranian nuclear EFTA00663298 activity would have to be carried out at Natanz. Last, the transformation to fuel rods would be done outside of Iran to ensure that the Iranians won't ever be able to use the enriched uranium for

it. You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinkin

o build a nuclear weapon: i) the Esfahan uranium conversion plant, where yellow cake is turned into uranium oxide and uranium hexafluoride; ii) the Natanz centrifuge complex; iii) the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, which, though yet to be fueled, offers a plutonium pathway to nuclear arms; iv) the

ore evident than in his treatment of nuclear weapons, the greatest threat to both U.S. security and world peace. The main hot spots are well known: North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. Instead, the president has focused for the last three years on Russia. President Obama believes that the best way to deal with

h of 20 percent enriched uranium (the Fordow facility accounted for 9.5 pounds of this total). The Iranian regime had 8,800 centrifuges spinning at Natanz and 696 at Fordow. Once the Islamic Republic can produce 44 pounds of highly enriched uranium per month, which is not that far off given the EFTA0

"bunker-buster" bomb, known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, was specifically designed to take out the hardened fortifications built by Iran and North Korea to cloak their nuclear programs. But initial tests indicated that the bomb, as currently configured, wouldn't be capable of destroying some of Iran

something that takes the mountain off," the official said. The official said the MOP may be more effective against Iran's main enrichment plant at Natanz but added: "But even that is guesswork." The Pentagon notified Congress in mid-January that it wants to divert around $82 million to refine the MOP

China Precision is also subject to sanctions from the United States =or selling technologies that the United States says could help Iran, Syria=and North Korea develop unconventional weapons. A State Department spokesw=man said this month that American officials had expressed to the Turkish g=vernment "ser

f it) if a military inte=vention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran i= required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be.acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water r=actor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of

. The AP (7/6) reports Britain on Monday announced economic sanctions against "individuals and organizations from Russia, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar and North Korea under new U.K. powers to punish human rights offenders." Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said the sanctions targeted those behind "some of the notor

ted it was behind a massive fire at an Iranian nuclear site last week." To the AP, "If Israel was responsible for the fire at the heavily fortified Natanz facility, it would mark another in a series of daring strikes against Iran's nuclear program attributed to Israel, while also risking Iranian retali

aponry is a military and political imperative. An electromagnetic shield could potentially halt incoming projectiles launched from Gaza, Tehran, or North Korea. A swarm of insect-size nano- drones could compensate for lack of familiarity with terrain and difficulties in attracting recruits for Israel's com

egotiation have a long pedigree. They began in 2003, after the revelation that Iran had been secretly constructing a uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water reactor at Arak. They have continued on and off in different permutations, with the Geneva negotiations the most recent and fulle

aking a bomb. If Iran becomes discouraged in its efforts, an easier and more immediately dangerous option is available: buying nuclear weapons from North Korea. When it comes to manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, the Iranian regime is in a bind. To further enrich its current stockpile of lowly-enri

ll not allow Iran to produce fissile fuel for weapons. Since the U.S. has munitions capable of destroying all of Iran's centrifuges above ground at Natanz and sealing off the entrances to its underground facilities at Fordo—plus the Stealth bombers to deliver these knockout punches-Iran would likely lo

nough fissile material to make a nuclear weapon within one year. The chances of Iran developing the bomb as a "threshold country" are considerable: North Korea did so after signing a similar deal in 2007. Becoming a nuclear power was the ayatollahs' initial objective and the reason Tehran invested around $

for more responsible countries? How could the United States cast greater legitimacy on the previously clandestine centrifuge facilities in Qom and Natanz than on those that would be aboveboard from the outset? Inevitably, multiple countries, including some rogue states, would insist on their own enri

From: Terje Rod-LarsH To: Jeffrey Epstein [email protected]> Subject: Fwd: Iran Is Progressing Towards Nuclear Weapons Via North Korea, by Lt. Col. (ret.) Dr. Refael Ofek Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 14:20:11 +0000 Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From: Terje Rod-Larsen D

vy water plutonium production reactor of Iran's military nuclear program, and possibly as an alternative to the Iranian uranium enrichment plant in Natanz in the event that it is dismantled. While the Iranian heavy water plutonium production reactor differed from the NK gas-graphite reactor, the urani