Epstein Secrets

ations Center in Oahu. It employed threat analysts to surrep- titiously monitor the secret activities of potential enemies, mainly China, Russia, and North Korea. A large part of their job was to make transparent to the United States the hostile activities of the Russian and Chinese services so that they posed

ing the NSA. In 2010, the NSA division that handled such security and espio- nage threats reportedly initiated a counterespionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters. According to a former NSA official, “They [were] looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA [was] convinced resided at Fort Meade a

adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Sev- eral hundred U.S. and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington, D.C., Fort Meade, Maryland, and Cheltenham, England, for months on end to determine which parts of the most powerful communications intelligence system in the world c

xceptions, the flights to them had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the US, and which could seize Snowden. The three exceptions were China, North Korea (via China) and Russia. The only one of these three countries, or any other country, that Snowden is known to have dealt with directly during his 33

the NSA. In 2010, the NSA’s “Q” division handled such security and espionage threats. It reportedly initiated a counter-espionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters on receiving the tip. But since the NSA’s cryptological service had in 2010 no fewer than 35,000 military and civilian contractor employ

le its adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Several hundred US and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington DC, Fort Meade, Maryland and Cheltenham, England for months on end to determine if which parts could be still salvaged from what had been until the Snowden breach t

e countries had stopovers in a country that was an ally of the United States, where officials could seize Snowden. The three excep- tions were China, North Korea (via China), and Russia. The only one of these three countries that Snowden is known to have had contact with directly during his thirty-three-day s

ing the breach to a team headed by Richard “Rick” Ledgett, who was then director of the NSA’s Threat Opera- tions Center at the NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. Ledgett was the logical choice to head the damage assessment inves- tigation because the center’s regional branch in Hawaii was under his

w on the activities of adversary nations in the Pacific region, it was able to monitor the ballistic missile tests and submarine activities of China, North Korea and Russia. As the NSA developed it, this Hawatian base became one of its primary regional bases for gathering Asian communications intelligence. By

the sensitive job of investigating the breach to Richard “Rick” Ledgett, the Director of the NSA’s Threat Operations Center at NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. It was a key position since the top- secret unit was responsible for discovering and countering the threats posed by Chinese, Russian and